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MONETARY RESILIENCE 
Rohan Grey* 
This Essay introduces a general framework for conceptualizing mone-
tary resilience, grounded in a legally sophisticated understanding of 
money and production.  It argues that monetary resilience can be im-
proved by embracing the dynamic relationship between local currency 
experimentation and global monetary reform.  It further argues that 
monetary reform efforts should be undertaken in coordination with 
broader efforts to achieve ecological sustainability and economic justice, 
such as the emerging movement for a “Green New Deal.” 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary geopolitics are increasingly defined by the interaction 
between climate change and the collapse of the neoliberal consensus in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.1  Growing num-
bers of people are grappling with feelings of precariousness and power-
lessness, as their futures appear to be dictated by global events beyond the 
control and influence of any one individual, community, or nation.  Some 
have reacted to this emerging dynamic by turning inwards, embracing re-
gional difference and increasingly militant assertions of local self-deter-
mination.  Others have responded in the opposite direction, reaffirming 
their commitment to cosmopolitan values and supranational institutions as 
necessary bulwarks against the renewed threat of parochial self-interest. 
 
* Rohan Grey is a J.S.D. candidate at Cornell Law School, the president of the Modern 
Money Network, a research scholar with the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, and a 
director of the National Jobs for All Network.  Special thanks to Asha Sandhu, Raúl Carrillo, 
Nathan Tankus, Scott Ferguson, and Ben Wilson for feedback on an earlier draft.  All mistakes 
remain my own. 
1. See, e.g., David Remnick, The Financial Crash and the Climate Crisis, NEW 
YORKER: NEW YORKER RADIO HOUR (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/pod-
cast/the-new-yorker-radio-hour/the-financial-crash-and-the-climate-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/RCN8-9HTF]. 
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Somewhat ironically, actors sympathetic to both tendencies have 
turned to the concept of “resiliency” for insights when navigating the chal-
lenges of an increasingly complex, interconnected world.2  For localists, 
resiliency evokes the ability to preserve and defend one’s self and com-
munity against the vagaries and disruptions of the world beyond.3  For 
internationalists, by contrast, resiliency implies a commitment to improv-
ing global regulatory and governmental regimes in order to minimize the 
systemic impact of particularized shocks and disruptions.4 
 
2. Kristen Magis, Community Resilience: An Indicator of Social Sustainability, 23 SOC’Y 
& NAT. RESOURCES 401, 401 (2010) (“Community resilience . . . is [defined as] the existence, 
development, and engagement of community resources by community members to thrive in an 
environment characterized by change, uncertainty, unpredictability, and surprise.”); Brian 
Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, art. 5, 2004, at 2, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/
print.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHK6-WC5S] (“Resilience is [defined as] the capacity of a system 
to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially 
the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”). 
3. See Keith Shaw & Louise Maythorne, Managing for Local Resilience: Towards a Stra-
tegic Approach, 28 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 43, 47 (2013) (“[R]esilience is closely associated 
with . . . dealing with external shocks, managing risk, and adapting to changed circum-
stances.”); David Sondermann, Towards More Resilient Economies: The Role of Well-Func-
tioning Economic Structures 2 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1984, 2016), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1984.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5QT-
XEH2] (“Resilience is here understood as the capacity to minimise output losses after an ad-
verse shock has hit the economy.”); Lucia Alessi et al., The Resilience of EU Member States to 
the Global Crisis, VOX (Sept. 26, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/resilience-eu-member-states-
global-crisis [https://perma.cc/SE6D-BZZK] (“[A] resilient society [i]s one that can respond to 
shocks and persistent structural changes in such a way that it does not lose its ability to deliver 
societal well-being in a sustainable way.”); Nadeem Badshah, Emergency Workers Being Hired 
to Handle Post-Brexit Disruption, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/politics/2018/oct/10/emergency-workers-being-hired-to-handle-post-brexit-disruption 
[https://perma.cc/QTV6-T5UF] (discussing the U.K. government’s advertising for “resilience 
advisers” to “handle any ‘disruption’ caused by the various permutations of Britain’s exit from 
the European Union”). 
4. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,677, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,229 (2014); Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. 
Affairs, Rep. on Climate Change Resilience: An Opportunity for Reducing Inequalities, at 3, 
U.N. Doc. E/2016/50/Rev.1-ST/ESA/363 (2016), https://wess.un.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/WESS_2016_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S2P-TCUG] (“[I]n the absence of 
well-assessed, far-reaching transformative policies at the national level, supported by effective 
global partnerships, building climate resilience will remain elusive and poverty and inequalities 
will likely be exacerbated.”); Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, The Chal-
lenge of Resilience in a Globalized World, at 17, EUR 27280 EN (2015), https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc-resilience-in-a-globalised-world_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5PX-L6NF]. 
[F]or both the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the ‘ash cloud’ crisis of 2010 it was 
clear that an international response was required both for policy and operation, and 
although the detailed policies and actions had not been defined in advance, the EU 
institutions provided a natural framework in which they could be devel-
oped . . . .  It is clear that . . . no single EU Member State could have achieved 
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Both approaches, while grounded in valid and meaningful concerns, 
are overly narrow and reify a false dichotomy between local and global 
system dynamics.  In contrast, an ecologically inspired approach to resil-
iency acknowledges the inherent interdependency of micro and macro-
scale dynamics5  and emphasizes ways in which “processes at one scale 
affect those at other scales to influence the overall dynamics of the sys-
tem.”6  Such an integrated approach can provide valuable guidance for 
policymakers and activists seeking to develop comprehensive, holistic so-
lutions to both environmental and economic challenges that situate and 
empower local actors as critical change agents. 
For example, the growing movement for a “Green New Deal” calls 
for a complete transformation of the global production system away from 
extractive and exploitative practices and in favor of sustainable and regen-
erative production methods.7  In order to achieve this goal, the movement 
 
these results alone.  That is the nature of resilience, which requires accepted mech-
anisms and a trusted team. 
 Id.; see, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, BUILDING A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SECTOR: 
REFORMS IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS 1 (Aditya Narain et al. eds., 2012). 
The journey of policymakers through Basel II and Basel III, and the initiatives of 
the Group of Twenty (G-20), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and national 
authorities . . . to identify the contours of a new financial architecture and to seek 
out policies and practices that can create a stable and resilient financial system 
capable of achieving its important mission. 
Id. 
5. See, e.g., Thomas W. Henfrey, Designing for Resilience: Permaculture as a Transdis-
ciplinary Methodology in Applied Resilience Research, 23 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, art. 35, 
2018, at 1–2, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss2/art33/ [https://perma.cc/JUG5-
8V4D]. 
Community resilience does not only refer to the capacity of a group of people 
united by common interest to exercise agency in responding to change locally.  It 
also takes into account their ability to instigate and contribute to transformation in 
the wider systems in which they are nested, because the latter are fundamentally 
incompatible with resilience at the scale of the local community. 
Id. 
6. Craig R. Allen et al., Panarchy: Theory and Application, 17 ECOSYSTEMS 578, 578 
(2014).  See generally Timothy O. Randhir, Globalization Impacts on Local Commons: Mul-
tiscale Strategies for Socioeconomic and Ecological Resilience, 10 INT’L. J. COMMONS 387, 
392 (2016) (“The [multiscale, ecosystem framework] . . . allows system-wide changes, inter and 
intra common interactions, and polycentric governance interactions using hierarchical systems 
of economic, ecological, and social systems of multiple commons.”). 
7. See Our Road to Victory on a Green New Deal, SUNRISE MOVEMENT, 
https://www.sunrisemovement.org/gnd-strategy [https://perma.cc/A28C-HYHZ].  See gener-
ally The Just Transition Alliance Definition of a Just Transition and Just Transition Principles, 
CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE (2018), https://climatejusticealliance.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/Just-Transition-Alliance-Just-Transition-Principles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MGL-96L9]. 
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has embraced a “Just Transition” framework, which centers considera-
tions of equity, racial and indigenous justice, and concern for communities 
most affected by climate change.8  Furthermore, advocates have insisted 
that any Green New Deal platform includes a job guarantee component, 
in order to protect individuals whose lives may be disrupted by the transi-
tion process.9  Such an approach grounds the struggle for the Green New 
Deal in the empowerment of individuals and communities, encouraging a 
positive feedback loop between local interests and global action. 
By contrast, efforts to transform the monetary system in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis have had limited success in harmonizing lo-
cally and globally oriented approaches.  This is partly due to the inherently 
abstract, contested, and hierarchical nature of money itself, which makes 
it difficult to align diverse monetary reform interests and stakeholders un-
der a single common program of action.10  In addition, it is difficult to 
build an effective coalition committed to large-scale monetary reforms in 
the absence of a common vision for positive economic transformation be-
yond the monetary system itself. 
However, responsibility also lies with monetary activists, as many 
have either downplayed and dismissed the value of local monetary activ-
ism11 or, alternatively, focused exclusively on local action at the expense 
of a more systemic approach.12  Both extremes, however unintentional, 
 
8. See Press Release, Climate Justice All, A Green New Deal Must Be Rooted in a Just 
Transition for Workers and Communities Most Impacted by Climate Change (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://climatejusticealliance.org/green-new-deal-must-rooted-just-transition-workers-commu-
nities-impacted-climate-change [https://perma.cc/823Q-P8XU]. 
9. See Varshini Prakash & Sarah Meyerhoff, It’s Time for the Climate Movement to Em-
brace a Federal Jobs Guarantee, THESE TIMES (May 24, 2018, 12:42 PM), http://inthe-
setimes.com/working/entry/21164/climate_movement_federal_jobs_guarantee_bernie_sand-
ers_2018 [https://perma.cc/9PZV-82ZG]. 
10. See Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Mac-
roeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1993). 
[E]ven if one wanted lawyers to promote economic stabilization by rethinking the 
macroeconomic role of the institutions they help shape, there is far less profes-
sional consensus about the workings of the macroeconomy than about microeco-
nomics.  If one wanted to apply “macro” to law, one must wonder “which macro?,” 
a challenge largely spared those who sought to introduce microeconomic reason-
ing into the law. 
Id. 
11. For example, the International Movement for Monetary Reform, an umbrella organi-
zation of monetary reform movements in over twenty countries, is focused exclusively on state 
currency systems, to the exclusion of private and community-based currencies.  See About the 
IMMR & Our Manifesto, INT’L MOVEMENT FOR MONETARY REFORM, https://international-
moneyreform.org/about/about/ [https://perma.cc/R9GE-YDYH]. 
12. See, e.g., Ed Collom, Community Currency in the United States: The Social Environ-
ments in Which It Emerges and Survives, 37 ENV’T & PLANNING A 1565, 1571 (2005) (third 
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have weakened and Balkanized local monetary activist efforts, while de-
priving the global monetary reform movement of the vitality, insight, and 
feedback that direct activism can provide. 
This Essay seeks to address these failures by proposing a framework 
that connects community and social currency initiatives at the local level 
with public monetary reform efforts at the global level.  In doing so, this 
Essay situates contemporary monetary activism efforts in the broader 
movement for productive and distributional justice as envisioned by the 
Green New Deal and Just Transition advocates.  Part I explores the nature 
of money and the ways in which monetary systems shape and are shaped 
by broader sociopolitical dynamics and legal arrangements.  Part II con-
siders the relationship between monetary design and different modes of 
economic production.  Finally, Part III introduces a framework for mone-
tary resiliency, grounded in a recognition and appreciation of local actors 
and communities as agents of broader systemic change. 
I. WHAT IS MONEY? 
According to standard economics textbooks, “money” first emerged 
as a technically superior alternative to in-kind bartering, solving the prob-
lem of the “double coincidence of wants” by functioning as a general “ur-
commodity” that other goods and services could be exchanged for and 
priced against.13  Money began historically with precious metallic coins, 
before later being supplanted by paper notes, and eventually, virtual ac-
counting entries in a computer.14  Today, “money” refers to anything ca-
pable of serving as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of 
value.15 
This narrative of the origins and evolution of money, while superfi-
cially plausible, lacks support in the historical record.16  To the contrary, 
 
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“[C]ommunity currency movement[s resem-
ble] . . . ‘communal’ or ‘communitarian’ social movements. . . . [which] seek ‘to establish 
small-scale social systems to remedy [the] ills of the larger society’ and ‘to live according to 
their own value systems outside of established social institutions.’”). 
13. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 324 (6th ed. 2011). 
14. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 458–60 (19th ed. 
2009). 
15. Id. at 459–60. 
16. L. Randall Wray, Alternative Approaches to Money, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
29, 39 (2010) (“The orthodox story of money’s origins is rejected by most serious scholars 
outside economics as historically inaccurate.”); L. Randall Wray, Introduction to an Alternative 
History of Money 3 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 717, 2012), 
https://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_717.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ3M-2HJS] (“Although this 
explanation of the origins of money and financial institutions is taught in almost all money and 
banking courses, it is internally inconsistent and has little historical foundation.”). 
 
510 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:505 
anthropological evidence indicates that money as we now understand it 
first appeared as an administrative tool for public authorities to command 
labor and manage the distribution of real resources.17  Rather than emerg-
ing from spontaneous, mutually beneficial interactions between peers, 
monetary regimes were first established by political authorities through 
the imposition of non-reciprocal debt obligations, such as taxes, fees, 
fines, and tithes, which could only be met through the tendering of mone-
tary instruments deemed valid by that authority.18  Furthermore, the earli-
est observed monetary technologies were not metallic coins or other phys-
ical objects with intrinsic use value, but rather symbolic tokens and 
accounting records created and maintained by a central government bu-
reaucracy.19  Thus, from the outset, money has been a collective, public 
enterprise that reflects the social hierarchies of the polity from which it 
emerged.20 
Nevertheless, money is more than a mere expression of public author-
ity.  Indeed, monetary regimes rarely, if ever, consist solely of official 
currency.21  Instead, any transferable private debt issued by an actor oper-
ating within the relevant jurisdiction can gain monetary properties, pro-
vided that other actors are willing to accept it as a means of settlement.22  
 
17. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5000 YEARS 59–60 (2011). 
18. Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 18, 24 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 
2016) [hereinafter Money as a Legal Institution]; Pavlina Tcherneva, Chartalism and the Tax-
Driven Approach to Money, in A HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE MONETARY ECONOMICS 69, 
72–73 (Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer eds., 2006). 
19. Michael Hudson, The Role of Accounting in Civilization’s Economic Takeoff, Intro-
duction to CREATING ECONOMIC ORDER: RECORD-KEEPING, STANDARDIZATION, AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 1, 2–3, 5 (Michael Hudson & 
Cornelia Wunsch eds., 2004).  See generally Denise Schmand-Besserat & Niloufar Moghimi, 
Making Tokens Talk, in NON-SCRIBAL COMMUNICATION MEDIA IN THE BRONZE AGE AEGEAN 
AND SURROUNDING AREAS 175, 177–80 (Anna Margherita Jasink et al. eds., 2017). 
20. See generally Roy Kreitner, The Jurisprudence of Global Money, 11 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 177 (2010) (discussing the relationship between domestic national political dy-
namics and international monetary regimes); Christine Desan, Creation Stories: Myths About 
the Origin of Money (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 13-20, 2013), https://dash.har-
vard.edu/handle/1/11689088 [https://perma.cc/82VG-7L3B] (discussing the impact of histori-
cal and social contexts on emergent monetary regimes); Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Money, Power, 
and Monetary Regimes 6–8 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 861, 2016), 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_861.pdf [https://perma.cc/L522-EV5C] [hereinafter 
Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes]. 
21. See A. Mitchell Innes, The Credit Theory of Money, 31 BANKING L.J. 151, 168 (1914) 
(“Credit and credit alone is money. . . .  The issue of money is not an exclusive privilege of 
government, but merely one of its functions . . . .  Money in one form or another is, in fact, 
issued by banks, merchants, etc.”). 
22. Thus, Hyman Minsky’s famous dictum, “everyone can create money; the problem is 
to get it accepted.”  HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 255 (1986). 
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Thus, modern monetary regimes are best conceived of as hybrid sys-
tems,23 comprised of an internal “hierarchy of monies” issued by different 
public and private actors and denominated in the public unit of account.24  
The various monies in the hierarchy circulate against each other in ways 
that reflect and shape geopolitical and power dynamics between differ-
ently situated institutions and interests. 
Of course, because they can reliably be used to satisfy public debts, 
including those that arise from private disputes, public monetary instru-
ments typically circulate with a greater degree of acceptance than those 
issued by non-public actors.25  Thus, they tend to enjoy a privileged posi-
tion at the top of the hierarchy.  Moreover, the conditions under which 
private monetary instruments can be issued and traded are always shaped 
by underlying legal and political arrangements,26 including, most notably, 
legal prohibitions on counterfeiting and other actions deemed threatening 
to the public authority’s monopoly over official currency issuance.27  
Hence, even “private” monies have a “public” dimension, in the sense that 
they implicate, and must remain accountable to, the broader public mon-
etary regime under which they operate. 
At the same time, the notion of “public authority” is itself complex 
and contested, incorporating multiple political jurisdictions and “publics” 
 
23. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2017) (“At its core, the modern financial system is effectively a public-
private partnership . . . .”); Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 
315, 315 (2013) (“[F]inancial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially 
hybrid place between state and market, public and private.”). 
24. See Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money, 25 CAMBRIDGE 
J. ECON. 149, 158–61 (2001); Perry Mehrling, The Inherent Hierarchy of Money 1–3 (Duncan 
Foley Festschrift Volume & Conference, 2012), https://ieor.columbia.edu/files/seasdepts/indus-
trial-engineering-operations-research/pdf-files/Mehrling_P_FESeminar_Sp12-02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/76NG-NSQ8]. 
25. Bell, supra note 24. 
26. See Money as a Legal Institution, supra note 18, at 30–31.  “[A] community deter-
mines which goods and services can be alienated, and thus what counts as a ‘commodity’, when 
it decides what items or services money can buy.”  Id. at 30.  “[T]he very definition of what can 
be ‘sold’ is determined by working out the legal operation of money.  The outcome created by 
keeping money out of some transactions and demanding it for others shapes what we recognize 
as ‘the market’.”  Id. at 31. 
27. Cf. Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes, supra note 20, at 12 (citation omitted) 
(“Economists have no theory of counterfeiting.  Because money is seen as a medium of ex-
change emerging from barter, the very limited writing on counterfeiting only examines the ques-
tion of whether it may be ‘efficient’.  In general, counterfeiting is treated as a marginal and 
unimportant phenomenon that is not theorized.”). 
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that individuals and communities simultaneously identify with and in-
habit.28  Furthermore, the legal system is inherently polycentric, reflecting 
the influence of not only lawmakers and jurists but also of social customs; 
governmental, private, and civil sector institutions; and the direct political 
action of actors and communities.29  Consequently, monetary pluralism 
exists not only with respect to public and private monies but also between 
different kinds of public monies, from vertically nested official currencies 
to horizontally distributed community and social currencies. 
II. MONETARY PRODUCTION 
Given the historically contingent and politically contested nature of 
money itself, it is unsurprising that monetary regimes can produce a di-
verse range of underlying production dynamics, depending on how they 
are structured.  For example, under a “simple” fiscal money regime, sub-
jects seek to earn enough currency to satisfy their publicly imposed mon-
etary obligations, but do not seek to accumulate more in order to save or 
purchase goods and services from other private actors.30  Hence, the total 
rate of monetarily induced production is determined by the size of the col-
lective “tax” obligation imposed on the population by the public authority.  
Alternatively, if the population also wishes to net save currency or obtain 
 
28. See Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency 
2–3 (May 8, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294124 
[https://perma.cc/3DU2-4QMW] (“Although its creators tend to espouse apolitical accounts of 
money, Bitcoin has been from the beginning a political project—an evolving, distributed con-
stitutional project, with many goals, visions, and factions.”); Alla Semenova, Would You Barter 
with God? Why Holy Debts and Not Profane Markets Created Money, 70 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
376, 394 (2011) (locating the origins of money and coinage of ancient Greece in “state-religious 
practices of centralized collection and redistribution. . . . established in a context of a debt rela-
tionship between men and deities . . . mediated through the temple authorities”). 
29. See generally Geoffrey Swenson, Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice, 20 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 438, 443 (2018) (“[E]stablishing the rule of law and the inclusive institutions that 
underpin it is usually a prolonged, highly contingent process with both top-down and bottom-
up elements.”). 
30. An example of a “simple” fiscal money system in current operation is the University 
of Missouri, Kansas City’s “Buckaroo” dollar.  Every semester, economics students are “taxed” 
in Buckaroo dollars and must “pay” the tax by the end of the semester in order to receive their 
final course grade.  The Economics department approves local non-profits to pay students in 
Buckaroo dollars for undertaking community service work, which students can then use to pay 
their own tax or sell to other students.  Warren Mosler, The UMKC Buckaroo: A Currency 
Model for World Prosperity, HUFFPOST (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:31 PM), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/warren-mosler/the-umkc-buckaroo-a-curre_b_970447.html [https://perma.cc/
7BRS-2FD4] (last updated Nov. 20, 2011). 
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goods and services made available for purchase in currency by other pri-
vate actors, the total rate of monetarily induced production is instead de-
termined by a combination of public and private sector behavior.31 
In more corporatized monetary regimes,32 the existence of institution-
alized “going concerns” whose immediate behavior is motivated by the 
accumulation of profit in excess of initial investment serves as an engine 
for even greater levels of monetarily induced production.33  In such re-
gimes, privately employed workers are under constant pressure to work 
harder and for lower wages to maintain corporate profit levels.34  This, in 
turn, leads the corporate sector to oppose policies such as direct public 
 
31. This principle is further discussed by Christine Desan: 
Making a [public monetary] token transferable [was] a simple modification but—
in a world without a shared measure, medium, or agreed-upon mode of payment—
a revolutionary one.  Once the token was allowed to travel, the person with it held 
an item that every other person who owed a contribution to the centre would be 
willing to take in exchange for goods. . . .  The unit creates a shared standard of 
value, making prices possible in the process . . . . 
Money as a Legal Institution, supra note 18, at 25. 
32. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Vi-
sionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 453 (2016) (providing a history of the evolution of the corporate form from a publicly 
franchised, special purpose entity to a general purpose, self-oriented going concern). 
33. This point is expanded upon by John Maynard Keynes: 
The distinction between a co-operative economy and an entrepreneur economy 
bears some relation to a pregnant observation made by Karl Marx . . . [, who] 
pointed out that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists 
seem often to suppose, a case of C-M-C’, i.e., of exchanging [one] commodity (or 
effort) [for another].  That may be the standpoint of the private consumer.  But it 
is not the attitude of business, which is the case of M-C-M’, i. e., of parting with 
money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 29, 81 
(Elizabeth Johnson & Donald Moggridge eds., 1978); see also Roy Kreitner, Toward a Political 
Economy of Money, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 7, 24 (Ugo 
Mattei & John D. Haskell eds., 2015) (“[W]hen M-C-M does become the dominant logic of the 
system of circulation, the economic system as a whole is geared toward the never-ending ex-
pansion of capital, limitless expansion that entails the creation and appropriation of surplus 
value.”). 
34. These dynamics often persist despite the fact that at the macro-level, wages determine 
rates of consumption, and with them, overall business profit margins.  See generally DAVID A. 
LEVY ET AL., JEROME LEVY FORECASTING CTR., LLC, WHERE PROFITS COME FROM 5 (2008), 
https://www.levyforecast.com/assets/Profits.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSV2-45EM]. 
As every entrepreneur knows, employee costs are a major influence on a firm’s 
profits.  Cutting payroll expenses means a more robust bottom line.  Accordingly, 
it is commonly believed that when firms throughout the economy hold down 
wages, they improve aggregate profits.  However, for the whole business sector, 
cutting employee compensation reduces revenue as well as expenses.  Less worker 
pay means less personal income and, therefore, less personal spending on the 
goods and services sold by businesses. 
Id. 
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employment, which would allow workers to accumulate currency without 
recourse to the private labor market.35  Thus, the logic of corporatized 
monetary accumulation ultimately ends up in tension with the logic of the 
fiscal money system that undergirds it, and results in chronic under-in-
vestment in public goods, as well as persistent involuntary unemployment. 
This tension reaches its apotheosis in contemporary capitalist-mone-
tary regimes, in which public authorities delegate responsibility for the 
creation of new monetary value to private, profit-driven financial institu-
tions such as commercial banks.36  In such regimes, the pursuit and reali-
zation of profit is transformed from the means to an end to the end itself, 
as societal investment decisions are driven by capital markets instead of 
public authorities.37  Furthermore, investments are judged primarily by 
their profitability, regardless of their relationship to, or impact on, social 
welfare or underlying systems of real production and consumption.38  The 
logic of monetary accumulation is thus finally turned inwards, onto the 
working of the monetary system itself.  In doing so, the deeper social goals 
and considerations that motivated the initial public creation of money are 
obscured, if not abandoned entirely. 
By contrast, many community currencies are designed explicitly to 
align with and further specific non-pecuniary social goals.  For example, 
in time-based currency systems,39 participants earn as much of the time-
currency as they wish—at a fixed hourly wage—by working on specific, 
collectively approved projects.  This enables individuals who lack other 
 
35. See M. Kalecki, Political Aspects of Full Employment, 14 POL. Q. 322, 324–25 (1943). 
36. According to Desan, the process of outsourcing responsibility for money creation from 
the public mint to the private banking system was the critical moment in the turn to contempo-
rary capitalism.  See CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE 
COMING OF CAPITALISM 360–62 (2014). 
37. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 126 
(Redvers Opie trans., 1961) (“The money market is always, as it were, the headquarters of the 
capitalist system, from which orders go out to its individual divisions, and that which is debated 
and decided there is always in essence the settlement of plans for further development.”). 
38. This concept is further discussed by L. Randall Wray: 
[T]rust investments [prior to the 1929 crash] amounted to little more than pyramid 
schemes—there was very little in the way of real production or income associated 
with all this trading in paper.  Indeed, as Galbraith shows, the “real” economy was 
already long past its peak—there were no “fundamentals” to drive the Wall Street 
boom. 
L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis, 40 
INT’L J. POL. ECON., no. 2, Summer 2011, at 7–8. 
39. See generally ED COLLOM ET AL., EQUAL TIME, EQUAL VALUE: COMMUNITY 
CURRENCIES AND TIME BANKING IN THE US (2012) (discussing examples of time-based com-
munity currencies in U.S. context); Jeffrey Jacob et al., The Social and Cultural Capital of 
Community Currency: An Ithaca HOURS Case Study Survey, 8 INT’L J. COMMUNITY 
CURRENCY RES. 42 (2004) (exploring the history of the Ithaca HOURS community currency). 
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employment opportunities to earn a living by contributing in ways deemed 
valuable by other members of the community.  Although individual labor 
productivity rates may vary, every individual is nevertheless entitled to 
equal rates of remuneration, reflecting an egalitarian respect for the equal 
value of every individual’s time.40 
Under a time-based currency regime, the value of the dollar issued is 
centered around the average hourly productivity rate of all worker-partic-
ipants in the system.  This encourages responsibility for improving pro-
ductive efficiency remains at the collective rather than individual level.  It 
also encourages a “democratic experimentalist” approach, whereby dis-
parate individuals and organizations cooperate by sharing knowledge and 
best practices in a cooperative manner.41 
Currency systems can also be designed to achieve ecological goals, 
such as encouraging sustainable production methods42 and maximizing 
the rate of energy returned on energy invested into the economy.43  Indeed, 
such considerations can even be incorporated into a time-based currency 
through offering wage-premia for projects with higher rates of energy re-
turn on energy investment, or restricting the kinds of approved projects 
based on environmental sustainability criteria.  In contrast to profit-centric 
currency systems—which subordinate social and environmental consider-
ations to the relentless and reductive logic of accumulation—socially-ori-
ented currency systems are capable of accommodating and reflecting a 
much wider set of considerations and production criteria. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL MONETARY RESILIENCE 
Local currencies are a key tool in building local monetary resilience.  
They increase monetary diversity, which reduces economic fragility by 
 
40. See COLLOM ET AL., supra note 39, at 10–15; Collom, supra note 12, at 1566–67. 
41. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998).  Dorf and Sabel define democratic experimentalism as “a 
new form of government . . . in which power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors 
to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances, but in which 
regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share their knowledge with others 
facing similar problems.”  Id. 
42. See Noel Longhurst & Gill Seyfang, Harnessing Grassroots Innovations: Comple-
mentary Currencies and Sustainability 10–12 (Int’l Conf. on Cmty. & Complementary Curren-
cies, 2011), http://base.socioeco.org/docs/a4-504-1-pb-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V77U-FVK9]; 
Gill Seyfang, Low-Carbon Currencies: The Potential of Time Banking and Local Money Sys-
tems for Community Carbon-Reduction 4–5 (Ctr. for Soc. & Econ. Res. on the Glob. Env’t, 
Working Paper No. 09-04, 2009), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48800/1/
601514130.pdf [https://perma.cc/28A9-QETM]. 
43. See Kenneth Mulder & Nathan John Hagens, Energy Return on Investment: Toward 
a Consistent Framework, 37 AMBIO, no. 2, 2008, at 75. 
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encouraging different production logics and value criteria that compensate 
for the weaknesses of the public monetary system.44  In Uganda, for ex-
ample, the Bangla-Pesa was introduced in local communities to address 
the problem of chronic underinvestment at the macro level by the national 
government.45  In Brazil, by contrast, municipal authorities in Curitiba be-
gan offering tokens that could be used for local bus transportation in ex-
change for engaging in trash collection that the city could otherwise not 
afford to undertake.46  In Japan, individuals care for the elderly beyond 
what is paid for by the national health services in exchange for a “Ticket 
for a Caring Relationship,” which they can use to pay for their own, or for 
relatives’ elder care.47  Such examples demonstrate the breadth and scope 
of possible uses of community currency systems. 
Notwithstanding these success stories, community currencies often 
struggle to gain widespread adoption outside of periods of economic cri-
ses.  This is due to difficulties in administration and scale, as well as the 
fact public currencies typically enjoy broader acceptance and official legal 
recognition.  To overcome these hurdles, some of the more historically 
successful complementary currencies explicitly adopted the fiscal logic of 
public monetary regimes, anchoring their value in the acceptability in pay-
ment of local taxes, fines, or other legal obligations.48  This anchor re-
duced the local currency’s degree of autonomy and independence from 
 
44. See Bernard Lietaer et al., Is Our Monetary Structure a Systemic Cause for Financial 
Instability? Evidence and Remedies from Nature, 14 J. FUTURES STUD., Mar. 2010, at 89, 103 
(“[D]ifferent types of currencies issued by different types of institutions would provide the di-
versity and the higher interconnectivity that a resilient financial system would require.”). 
45. Mwangi S. Kimenyi & David Muthaka, Bangla-Pesa: Slum Currency and Implica-
tions for the Poor in Developing Countries, BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (July 17, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/07/17/bangla-pesa-slum-currency-and-implica-
tions-for-the-poor-in-developing-countries [https://perma.cc/T7A5-FMSY]. 
46. MATTHEW T. RICHARDS & KRISTIAN STEPHEN SøNDERGAARD COLVEY, 
COMPLEMENTARY CURRENCIES: LOCAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 46, http://lf.is.free.fr/
World%20Changing/Rarete/Complementary%20Currencies%205.26.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
978J-NDTU]. 
47. See Mayumi Hayashi, Japan’s Fureai Kippu Time-Banking in Elderly Care: Origins, 
Development, Challenges and Impact, 16 INT’L J. COMMUNITY CURRENCY RES. 30, 35–36 
(2012). 
48. See, e.g., GWENDOLYN HALLSMITH & BERNARD LIETAER, CREATING WEALTH: 
GROWING LOCAL ECONOMIES WITH LOCAL CURRENCIES 212 (2011) (“[T]he most effective 
way for a governmental entity at any level to encourage the acceptance of any complementary 
currency is to require that it be used for payment of a tax.”); see also Loren Gatch, Tax Antici-
pation Scrip as a Form of Local Currency in the USA During the 1930s, 16 INT’L J. 
COMMUNITY CURRENCY RES. 22, 23 (2012) (“[T]ax anticipation scrip was distinctive in that it 
could be used by citizens to meet the broader obligations they had toward their local govern-
ments.  This is what . . . assured that it circulated for a far longer time . . . than any other variety 
[of complementary currency].”); Mark S. Peacock, Complementary Currencies: History, The-
ory, Prospects, 29 LOC. ECON. 1, 708, 720 (2014) (“[T]he ability or necessity to pay part of 
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the public monetary system, but in exchange provided it with greater le-
gitimacy and stability with respect to its underlying value. 
Such an approach allows local currencies to emerge organically from 
below, and then receive public support from above through the granting 
of tax-receivable status.  This dynamic, in turn, points towards the possi-
bility of an alternative hierarchy of money, in which banks and other pri-
vate financial institutions responsible for shaping and directing investment 
are replaced by nested community currencies, operating in accordance 
with common principles of ecological, economic, and social justice. 
To best promote monetary resiliency, local currency activism should 
be undertaken with globally-minded and radical monetary reform goals in 
mind.49  For example, rather than beginning with a specific preferred cur-
rency model, and then considering ways in which it could be adapted to 
fit with a broader activist strategy, communities should first determine 
what currency model is most likely to address the identified problem at 
the appropriate scale.  Only then should communities determine how to 
act locally in order to achieve these goals.  In some cases, this may require 
redirecting efforts away from strategies that generate immediate results in 
favor of longer-term projects, and vice-versa. 
On the other hand, it is important not to overstate the potential for 
local currencies to replace public currencies or to indulge exclusively in 
local currency activism at the expense of coordinated efforts aimed at 
transforming public monetary regimes more broadly.  In addition, it is 
critical that local actions be consistent with the scope and scale of the 
problems they seek to address.  It is insufficient, for example, to respond 
to the threat of climate change solely by attempting to reduce local carbon 
emissions, absent a theory of how doing so will further the broader goal 
of decarbonizing global economic production.  Similarly, it is a categori-
cal error to attempt to solve a crisis of chronic federal under-investment 
through the introduction of a local currency, if critical local services and 
infrastructure remain dependent on federal funding. 
Nevertheless, despite their limitations, local currencies have the po-
tential to serve as vital laboratories of monetary experimentation, gener-
ating lessons and insights for broader public reform efforts and providing 
 
one’s taxes in a [complementary currency] would . . . promote the use of the relevant [comple-
mentary currency].”). 
49. Or, to borrow a line attributed to Alvin Toffler, “You’ve got to think about the big 
things while you’re doing the small things, so that all the small things go in the right direction.”  
Graham Speechley, You’ve Got to Think About the Big Things, LEADERSHIP QUOTE, http://lead-
ershipquote.org/youve-got-to-think-about-the-big-things/ [https://perma.cc/B3WR-KUCG] 
(quoting Alvin Toffler). 
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a space to reimagine money from first principles.50  Local currency initia-
tives also encourage communities to conceptualize and articulate their col-
lective economic identity and interests in explicitly monetary terms.51  
Furthermore, the experience of designing, introducing, and administering 
a local currency can help to recruit and train aspiring monetary activists 
who may otherwise find currency systems overly technical, abstract, or 
alienating. 
CONCLUSION 
As questions of monetary design and economic ordering become in-
creasingly salient in global discussions about how to implement a Green 
New Deal via a Just Transition, monetary activists have an obligation to 
listen and learn from their friends and allies in the environmental justice 
space and to take seriously the challenge of building monetary resilience 
across all layers of society.  The aim of this Essay has not been to set forth 
a fully developed theory of monetary resilience but rather to provoke a 
discussion about how to ensure monetary reform efforts are coordinated, 
holistically informed, and rooted in the lived experience of local commu-
nities.  Community currency initiatives have great potential to enhance 
local economic resiliency, empower monetary activists, and facilitate ex-
perimentation in monetary design.  In order to be most effective, however, 
such initiatives must be undertaken in coordination with global public 
monetary reform efforts, and informed by a broader substantive vision of 
economic and environmental justice. 
 
50. See, e.g., Farley Grubb, Is Paper Money Just Paper Money? Experimentation and 
Variation in the Paper Monies Issued by the American Colonies from 1690 to 1775 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17997, 2012) (observing that the issuance of 
paper monies by the British North American colonies were “neither uniform nor coordinated” 
and “[w]hile not consciously intended to be so . . . [constituted] monetary experimentation on a 
grand scale”). 
51. See, e.g., Christine Desan, From Blood to Profit: Making Money in the Practice and 
Imagery of Early America, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 26, 30 (2008). 
The bills of credit used [as money] by early Americans kept their value because 
they were worth gold in paying provincial taxes.  That mechanism defined them 
as a local currency, the liquid specific to a particular body politic.  The “author-
ship” of money in turn supported a sense of corporal identity. 
Id. 
